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ASPIRATION AND UNDERENFORCEMENT 
Kermit Roosevelt III T∗ T 
Replying to Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and 
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006). 
Professor Fallon’s article T1 T is a valuable contribution to the emerg-
ing body of literature that applies what could be called the decision 
rules model to the study of constitutional law.  The model distinguishes 
between the meaning of the Constitution — its actual grants of rights 
and powers — and the doctrine that courts create to decide whether 
rights have been violated or powers exceeded.  In the terms used by 
Professor Mitchell Berman, which are becoming conventional, the 
model separates the Constitution’s operative propositions from judicial 
decision rules. T2 T 
The distinction between decision rules and operative propositions is 
a powerful analytic tool.  Although it can be traced back to the nine-
teenth century, Professor Fallon deserves credit as one of the earliest 
modern scholars to present it as a general account of constitutional de-
cisionmaking.T3 T  I and others have used it to examine and critique par-
ticular areas of doctrine. T4 T  In this article, Professor Fallon takes a dif-
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TIn 1893, Professor James Bradley Thayer marked the distinctive nature of judicial decision 
rules with the observation that a legislator who had voted against a law as unconstitutional 
might, if placed on the bench, “there find it his duty, although he has in no degree changed his 
opinion, to declare it constitutional.”  James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).  Professor Fallon developed the 
idea in Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Con-
stitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING 
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ferent taxonomic tack, focusing on one of the factors that go into the 
shaping of particular decision rules.  That factor is the need for judi-
cially manageable standards.  Though it is most prominent in the po-
litical question doctrine, the demand for such standards exists else-
where.5  By focusing on the pervasiveness of this particular factor, 
Professor Fallon offers a deeper insight into the role it plays in the con-
struction of decision rules.  And, in what I find to be the article’s most 
interesting and original move, he suggests that it may also play a role 
in nonjudicial constitutional enforcement, one that might lead us to a 
different understanding of the nature of constitutional rights. 
As should be evident already, this is a project for which I have a 
great deal of sympathy, and much of the article strikes me as both 
valuable and fairly clearly correct.  I believe Professor Fallon is cor-
rect, in particular, to reject what he calls the pragmatist position, 
which “postulates a tautological relationship between constitutional 
doctrine and constitutional meaning.”6  Professor Daryl Levinson’s 
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration7 is probably the most 
comprehensive statement of the “pragmatist” position.  To the extent 
that it rejects a supposed dichotomy between rights and remedies, 
however, it is not in fact a challenge to the decision rules model.  Deci-
sion rules straddle the right-remedy divide that Professor Levinson at-
tacks.  They are rules that courts apply to determine whether rights 
have been violated.  They are not statements about the actual contours 
of rights; that is the whole point of the distinction.  But neither are 
they entirely rules about when remedies will be awarded; remedial 
analysis may follow the conclusion that a right has been violated and 
may grant or withhold a remedy accordingly. 
It is certainly true, as Professor Levinson argues, that remedial con-
siderations exert an important influence over the shape of constitu-
tional decision rules.  The consequences and feasibility of awarding a 
particular remedy will affect a court’s assessment of enforcement costs 
and costs of error.8  But that is not the same thing as saying, as Profes-
sor Levinson does, that such considerations exert an influence over the 
shape of constitutional operative propositions or rights.9  The interrela-
tion of remedies and decision rules is, in short, entirely consistent with 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
protection, free exercise); Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due 
Process, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming Aug. 2006) (substantive due process). 
 5 In my taxonomy of factors, the need for judicially manageable standards is subsumed under 
the headings “Enforcement Costs” and “Guidance for Other Governmental Actors.”  See Roose-
velt, Constitutional Calcification, supra note 4, at 1665–66. 
 6 Fallon, supra note 1, at 1313. 
 7 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
857 (1999). 
 8 See Roosevelt, Constitutional Calcification, supra note 4, at 1661, 1665. 
 9 See Levinson, supra note 7, at 890. 
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the decision rules model.  To point out that interrelation is simply to 
focus attention on one of the factors that goes into the creation of deci-
sion rules — it is essentially the same thing that Professor Fallon’s ar-
ticle does. 
From that perspective, Professor Levinson’s article is a contribu-
tion, and an excellent one, to the body of decision rules scholarship.  
Professor Levinson, however, does not seem to see it that way; he sug-
gests to the contrary that his analysis undermines the idea that consti-
tutional rights can be over- or underenforced.  He argues that exami-
nation reveals that all constitutional rights are over- or underenforced, 
which makes it “both pointless and indeterminate” to speculate about 
the shape of rights themselves.10
As any pragmatist would concede, the test of that assertion must be 
practical; it must be whether the decision rules model is a useful way 
of understanding and critiquing constitutional decisions.  Demonstrat-
ing the model’s utility was one of the main aims of my Constitutional 
Calcification, and my claim there was that an unthinking equation of 
decision rules and operative propositions leads to a number of mis-
takes. 
To reprise one example, consider the question of equal protection 
analysis of racial classifications.  Suppose that everyone agrees that ra-
cial classifications that disadvantage minorities should receive strict 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.  If we deny the distinction 
between decision rules and operative propositions, this prescription 
must be a statement about the meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  And if that is so, there is substantial appeal to the argument 
that in fact proved decisive in extending strict scrutiny to racial classi-
fications that seem to benefit minorities: equal protection must protect 
everyone equally, so if some racial classifications receive strict scrutiny, 
all of them should.11
Attending to the distinction between decision rules and operative 
propositions reveals that this argument is not necessarily sound.  One 
might endorse strict scrutiny for racial discrimination against minori-
ties as a decision rule for two quite different reasons.  First, one might 
believe that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is a general 
prohibition of racial classifications: the Clause deems them so offensive 
that they can be allowed only to achieve some extraordinarily impor-
tant government interest.  On this view, the strict scrutiny decision 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 Id. at 925. 
 11 This argument was endorsed by Justice Powell.  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 289–90 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (“The guarantee of equal protection cannot 
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of 
another color.”).  The argument also does most of the work in Justice O’Connor’s majority opin-
ion in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995), which itself cites Bakke. 
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rule serves to ensure that the harm from the use of a racial classifica-
tion is balanced by an important state interest.  Second, one might be-
lieve that the meaning of the Clause is a prohibition of discrimination 
that arises from a lack of equal concern and respect for the burdened 
group.  On this view, a strict scrutiny decision rule for racial discrimi-
nation against minorities makes sense because such classifications are 
extremely likely to be of that sort.  Strict scrutiny on this view smokes 
out impermissible legislative motivations.12
The pragmatist claim is that since it is decision rules that decide 
cases, speculating about meaning is idle.  But which view one takes of 
constitutional meaning will have very significant consequences for the 
appropriate treatment of affirmative action.  If the meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause is that racial classifications are bad, then all 
racial classifications should presumably receive equivalent scrutiny, 
and the decision rules for classifications burdening and benefiting mi-
norities will be symmetrical.  But if the meaning is that discrimination 
arising from a lack of equal concern and respect is prohibited, height-
ened scrutiny can sensibly be allocated to cases in which discrimina-
tion is most likely to proceed from a failure to give equal weight to the 
interests of the disadvantaged individuals — something that can be 
said much more easily of discrimination against racial minorities than 
of discrimination in their favor. 
Distinguishing between decision rules and operative propositions 
here gives a perspicuous view of the grounds of disagreement with re-
spect to affirmative action: it suggests that the agreement about the 
appropriate decision rule for discrimination against racial minorities 
masks a disagreement about the underlying operative proposition.  It 
also rebuts the argument that strict scrutiny for affirmative action fol-
lows inexorably from the proposition that equal protection must pro-
tect everyone equally.  While a symmetry requirement makes a good 
deal of sense at the level of operative proposition, whether decision 
rules should be symmetrical depends on our view of the relevant op-
erative proposition.13
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 
 12 See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 438–39 (1997) (describ-
ing smoking-out and balancing understandings of strict scrutiny). 
 13 For other examples of this sort of analysis, see Roosevelt, Constitutional Calcification, supra 
note 4, at 1693–1700, 1707–13, which discusses Commerce Clause and Section Five enforcement 
power.  Professor Levinson’s response, Professor Fallon suggests, is that this analysis is useful only 
if operative propositions can be reverse-engineered from decision rules and further that such re-
verse-engineering is impossible because courts do not in fact decide cases by first identifying op-
erative propositions and then crafting decision rules.  See Fallon, supra note 1, at 1316 & n.185; 
Levinson, supra note 7, at 873 (claiming that the decision rules model “bears little resemblance to 
the actual judicial practice of rights-construction”).  It is certainly true that in many cases judges 
simply apply or refine existing decision rules.  But when it considers a new decision rule, the 
Court frequently addresses the distinction quite self-consciously.  Professor Fallon’s article shows 
it doing so in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).  Other examples include the plurality opin-
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So I find the decision rules model quite useful, and Professor 
Fallon’s extended analysis of the pervasive effect of the need for judi-
cially manageable standards is likewise a valuable contribution.  I 
have some reservations, however, about his extension of what he calls 
the “permissible disparity thesis” to nonjudicial actors and the implica-
tions he draws from that extension. 
The permissible disparity thesis holds that “a gap frequently exists 
between constitutional meaning and judicially enforced doctrine.”14  In 
this form, it follows more or less immediately from the decision rules 
model.  Professor Fallon’s novel suggestion is that permissible dispar-
ity may exist also with respect to the obligations of nonjudicial actors, 
and that consequently the “best rationalizing explanation” of the gap 
may take a particular normative cast: some “background rights” may 
be “partly aspirational, embodying ideals that do not command com-
plete and immediate enforcement.”15
I confess to viewing the prospect of nonjudicial underenforcement 
and aspirational rights with something less than complete equanimity.  
One source of the discomfort is the fact that many of the reasons that 
can be offered for judicial underenforcement do not justify its practice 
by nonjudicial actors. 
Perhaps the most prominent reason for judicial underenforcement 
is the belief that some other actor is simply better at determining con-
stitutional requirements in particular circumstances.  Suppose, for in-
stance, that the commerce power authorizes Congress to regulate ac-
tivities that substantially affect interstate commerce, an understanding 
that follows fairly plausibly from reading the Commerce Clause in 
conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause.16  The question of 
whether a given activity substantially affects interstate commerce is 
one that Congress is likely better at answering than courts, and defer-
ential review of the congressional conclusion is therefore likely to pro-
duce fewer errors than nondeferential review.  Likewise, legislatures 
are probably generally better at weighing costs and benefits, and a 
court that thinks that the meaning of some constitutional provisions 
(for instance, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses) requires 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973), and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985), both of which articulated criteria for heightened equal protection 
scrutiny; Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 265 (2000), which defined procedures that adequately 
safeguard the right to appellate counsel; and even United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 
144, 152 n.4 (1938), which offered a general theory of when nondeferential decision rules are justi-
fied.  
 14 Fallon, supra note 1, at 1317. 
 15 Id. at 1324–25. 
 16 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); Roosevelt, Constitutional 
Calcification, supra note 4, at 1674. 
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that the benefits of a law exceed its costs will likely minimize errors by 
generally deferring to legislative assessments. 
Nonjudicial underenforcement, however, does not take the form of 
deferring to another actor’s assessment of constitutional requirements 
in the hope of thereby minimizing constitutional violations.  Instead, 
this sort of “underenforcement” amounts to a knowing violation of the  
Constitution — for example, passing a law despite believing that the 
regulated activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce.  
The goal of minimizing total constitutional violations will seldom be a 
justification. 
A related reason for judicial underenforcement, or for the creation 
of a decision rule whose shape varies substantially from that of the 
underlying operative proposition, is that the operative proposition 
turns on a fact that the judiciary is simply incompetent to ascertain.  
That government acts cannot be based on personal hostility to those 
affected is a plausible operative proposition, but it is not one that 
courts can readily enforce.  Likewise, a requirement that officials 
weigh the interests of affected parties equally, or not try to silence 
speakers because they disagree with the message, turns on subjective 
mental states.  When operative propositions relate to mental states, 
courts frequently underenforce them or employ objective tests as sub-
stitutes.17  But here again the rationale offers no support for nonjudi-
cial underenforcement, since compliance in such cases is perfectly 
within the nonjudicial actor’s ability. 
Judicial underenforcement might also be based on an assessment 
that full enforcement will do more harm than good because it will be 
unacceptably costly in terms of other constitutional values.  Nondefer-
ential review of due process challenges to economic regulation, or dis-
crimination with respect to nonsuspect classes, for instance, might be 
thought to trench too deeply on the ability of the representative 
branches to make policy choices, thereby raising separation of powers 
concerns.18  This too is a rationale that nonjudicial actors generally 
cannot invoke. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 2, at 67. 
 18 This sort of observation inspires the pragmatist response that if the construction of decision 
rules is constrained by considerations of constitutional principle, then decision rules are of equal 
stature with operative propositions, a point Professor Rick Hills has made to me in conversation.  
I agree that in some cases the Constitution severely limits judicial choice of decision rules.  The 
refusal to enforce constitutional provisions in the face of “a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department” is a clear example.  Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).  But the question of whether sex-based classifications should receive 
heightened scrutiny, for instance, strikes me as one that is simply not resolved by the meaning of 
the Constitution.  The answer will depend on how a judge weighs the factors that go into the 
creation of decision rules, and Professor Fallon is right to suggest that how a judge would balance 
the factors is perhaps the most important judicial qualification, one to which we should be far 
more attentive than we are.  See Fallon, supra note 1, at 1321–22. 
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Why then might a nonjudicial actor be justified in underenforcing 
a constitutional operative proposition?  Professor Fallon’s answer is 
that just as manageability concerns may lead courts to underenforce, 
nonjudicial actors can give weight to practical costs.19  To some extent, 
this claim is undeniable.  An executive official promulgating guidelines 
for subordinates might very well choose bright-line rules that do not 
precisely fit the operative propositions.  Such an official is in much the 
same position as a court articulating decision rules, and similar consid-
erations would apply.  Indeed, one might expect such an official to in-
struct subordinates to follow whatever decision rules the courts have 
created. 
But what if a nonjudicial actor’s assessment of practical costs leads 
her to a rule other than the one courts have created?  In such circum-
stances, we might hope that courts will give respectful consideration to 
the nonjudicial suggestion, but we should expect judicial doctrine to 
prevail.20  A fair amount of judicial doctrine, in fact, could be under-
stood as articulating what sorts of practical considerations may justify 
nonjudicial underenforcement.  For example, by holding that adminis-
trative convenience is merely a legitimate (and not a compelling) state 
interest, the Court has effectively ruled that it is not a practical consid-
eration sufficient to justify nonjudicial “underenforcement” of equal 
protection through sex-based discrimination.21
Professor Fallon agrees with this, I believe, which is why he con-
siders nonjudicial underenforcement to be relevant primarily in cir-
cumstances in which the judiciary also underenforces to at least the 
same degree.22  But rather than view this as a narrow range of cases, 
he suggests that it might also apply to and explain constitutional 
change in areas such as equal protection where constitutional provi-
sions “reflect moral ideals.”23  Brown v. Board of Education,24 he sug-
gests, can be understood as a fuller enforcement of an idea of equality 
that was merely aspirational at the time of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s ratification.25
This is one explanation of constitutional change, but it is not the 
only one, and it is perhaps unduly teleological.  The idea that realiza-
tion of the “full conceptual meaning” of some constitutional provisions 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 See Fallon, supra note 1, at 1324. 
 20 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), and Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000), 
are two examples of the Supreme Court’s consideration of decision rules developed by nonjudicial 
actors.  See generally Roosevelt, Constitutional Calcification, supra note 4, at 1668–72. 
 21 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).   
 22 See Fallon, supra note 1, at 1324 (describing the role of officials “charged with implementing 
judicially underenforced constitutional guarantees”). 
 23 Id. at 1326. 
 24 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 25 Fallon, supra note 1, at 1325–26. 
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is an ongoing venture suggests that constitutional interpretation is to a 
significant degree a philosophical task.  But the idea that ratifiers 
adopting abstract constitutional provisions intend thereby to authorize 
philosopher-judges to instruct them on the full conceptual meaning    
of their words is neither particularly likely nor, to me, particularly    
attractive. 
One might instead say that the applications of an unchanging op-
erative proposition such as a ban on unjustified discrimination are in-
evitably and properly informed by societal views about what is justi-
fied or natural and what is invidious.26  “Progress” on such issues 
occurs not when society is ready to embrace the full meaning of its 
pre-existing commitments but when social attitudes shift — when dif-
ferential treatment of blacks, or women, or gays, stops seeming natural 
and starts seeming invidious.27  The work in such cases is done not  
by philosophers or legal theorists but by social movements and norm  
entrepreneurs.28
Consider Professor Fallon’s modern example of a Court that be-
lieves both that the full conceptual meaning of the Constitution in-
cludes a background right to gay marriage and that announcing such a 
right would trigger a backlash likely to include a constitutional amend-
ment banning gay marriage.  In such a case, he suggests, the Court 
“should decline to adopt a rule of decision enforcing the background 
right.”29
This conclusion is not obvious to me.  It is not clear what value 
justifies concealing from the American people their constitutional 
commitments nor why a judge may legitimately prefer the unamended 
Constitution to the hypothetical amended one.  I would say that the 
prospect of such a backlash is not so much a practical factor to be con-
sidered as it is evidence that the background right does not exist.  If a 
national supermajority thinks a particular form of discrimination is 
justified, I would take that as good evidence that the Equal Protection 
Clause does not forbid it.30
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 See generally KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING 
SENSE OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 47–58 (forthcoming 2006). 
 27 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995). 
 28 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 929–30 
(1996) (describing norm entrepreneurs); Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (Or Fail 
To Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (2005); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional 
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002). 
 29 Fallon, supra note 1, at 1329. 
 30 That is, I take the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to be something like a ban on 
unjustified discrimination, but I believe that analysis of justification cannot be performed in a 
philosophically pure way but must (and should) be conducted with reference to current national 
societal understandings. 
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That national sentiment could of course change, and we could find 
evidence of that change in a series of state legislative acts or judicial 
decisions recognizing a state-law right to gay marriage.  Such a pattern 
could lead a federal court to conclude that marriage discrimination is 
no longer justified.  This was the progress from Bowers v. Hardwick31 
to Lawrence v. Texas:32 evolution of societal attitudes, reflected in ob-
jective indicia, changed the outcome of constitutional cases.  This 
process is quite distinct from the judicial explication of the full concep-
tual meaning of equality.  We might hope that social attitudes will 
bend toward justice, but their progress will be determined less by what 
we do as judges or scholars than by what we do as citizens. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 32 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
